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JOYCE: BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND
AQUINAS
LJBERATO SANTORO-RIUENZA
A comprcllensin~ history of aesthetic theol'ies profJered by literary
writers and artists in general has not yet been written, perhaps also
becausl~in my opinion-it would (with a few notable and rare excep-
tions, some of which have already been recorded) yield much disap-
pointment,
In the case of James Joyce, a section of his Critical JVritillgs 1 has been
given the title of 'Aesthetics', and considerable scholarship has been
devoted to the study of the writer's ideas on the subject, Fr, ~oon's ./O)'ce
alld Aquinas,~ of 19'">7, is a substantial and elaborate piece of generous
scholarship that Joyce's musings may perhaps not entirely deserve, In
more recent years, Jacques Aubert has revisited the issue, The Aesthetics
'!I' Chaosmos,,1 by Umberto Eco-no less generous than 1\oon-is really,
and despite its title, an exploration of the poetic strategies, rhetorical
devices and linguistic mechanisms spectacularly deployed by the Irish
writer, Eco's main purpose was to illustrate the new precepts of avant-
garde poetics, as instanced in the writings of Joyce, and to show-by
contrast and analogy, at once-the (oillcido/tia oppositorum between
medieval aesthetics and avant-garde poetics, As he stated in the intro-
ductory note to the book, "To me Joyce was the node where the \1iddle
Ages and the avant-garde meet, and the present book is the story and
the historical-theoretical foundation of such a paradoxical meeting,"
(The first version of the mentioned book appeared as an extended essay
in Opera Aperta, which was mainly concerned with avant-garde poetics,
in general.)"'
A brief synopsis of Eco's thought-provoking interpretation, which
unravels the hidden machinations of Joyce's literary genius, could
help us appreciate the significance, ambition and magnitude of Joyce's
project.
In the early writings-Stephen /1ero, A Portrait (!l the Artist as aroung
JUan':' and VuMiners-Eco traces, among the numerous inlluences upon
the young artist, three main lines: the presence of Aquinas and medieval
aesthetics; the response to Ibsen's call fill' closer ties between art and
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life; and the influence of the symbolist poets: their aesthetic ideal of a
lile devoted to art and of art as a substitute IIJI' life, with their call to
answer the deep questions of existence by delving into the mysterious
alchemy of language.
The transition li'om Scholasticism to Symbolism is perhaps best
exemplified by Joyce's concept of eplphant a way of letting reality
disclose itself and arrest our imagination, and a way of defining reality
through discourse. Summing up .Joyce's intentions, we could agree with
him that art docs not record nor imitate. It produces epiphanic insights
that make the reader seize, in the words of Stephen HI'rO, "the inside
true inwardness of reality" across the "sextuple gloria of light actually
retained."(i
Eco remarks that:
with this, Joyce again approaches the Thomist pusition in which the
beautiful object would be that 'ill cllillS aspectll Sell "oglliliolle If/lle/elllr
appetill/.l.', and the tidIness of aesthetic perception would consist in
a sort of pa.f, a cOlllemplative g'ratification. This pax can be easily
identifit'd with the conct'pt of aesthetic 'stasis', lllentioned in the I'aris
Nutehook, in which Joyce resolws the Aristotelian idea of ·catharsis'.'
(Rut, then, by an allllost imperceptible change of tunc and a quick
twist of the pen, the Irish magician claimed that comedy is superior to
tragedy because, as he claimed to understand, comedy yields 'rest', while
tragedy leaves us prey to 'desire' and 'loathing'.)
\Vith U~)'sses, .royce lIIo\'l~d on to new strategies and a more ambitious
project. Dub/iners was concei\'ed as a 'moral history' of Ireland, told in
a realistic tone and a literal JiCY. U~)'sses, instead, is constructed as a vast
metaphor ill all allegorical tone and key. As he explained in one of his
Letters:
It [Ulysses~ is an epic of two races (Israelite-Irish) and at the same
time the cycle of thl- human hody as \wlJ as a little story of a Jay
(lite).... It is also a sort of encyclopaedia. My intention is to transpose
the myth SIIb sp.·..ie tell/puns /lusll'/. Each adn'nturt' (that is, every hour,
t'very organ, every art being' intercunnt'cted and intt'rrelated in thl'
structural scheme of the whole) should not only condition hut even
create its own techniqul·. s
This extraordinary novel is desi~ned as a sell:'contained, sell:'encolll-
passing work: a \Vork-as-CoslIlos,
The contlict that inspired and sustained the early works: a contlict
between a world conceived according to traditional (realist? Tholllist?)
categories and the search lor a contemporary sensibility, assumes-in
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U~)'sses, and later in Finnegans ff/llke--a new II)rm and more spectacular
dimensions, Joyce paradoxically superimposes the classical order onto
the chaotic world of a new sensibility inlormed by relativity and
uncertainty.~ The resulting image of the U~)'Sses-universe stands as a
blueprint of contemporary culture and an 'epistemic metaphor' of its
time-which is still our time,
I,
According to Eco, U~rsses prt'sents the incredible image of a world that
amazingly rests on the preserved structure of an old world, accepted
lor its II>rlllal reliability but denied in its substantial \'alue, Ulysses con-
stitutes a \\'atershed II)r contemporary sensibility. It tells the dramatic
story of a dissociated consciousness that tries to reintegrate itself,
seeking its own 'objective correlative'-as TS, Eliot, Erich Heller, and
Hegel befl)re them, would put it,
An eloquent instance of the quintessential characters of avant-
garde poetics, UZrsses could be read, f(lI'mally, as a highly improbable
"enormous treatise on quantum physics which paradoxically subdivides
its material in the manner of the Summa Theologiae, and li'eely uses
concepts and examples frolll early Gred, physics,"'O UZrsses is a great
modern epic moulded, like Dame's Commedia, in the classical mode,
'-laving been called playliilly 'the Dante of Dublin' by his Iellow stu-
dents, in later years Joyce vowed to immortalise Dublin, just as Dante
had eternalised Florence, He kept his promise and \\Tote U~)'Ss('s: har-
monious and resonant, albeit in a modern tongue, as the symphonic
music of Dante's verse, And certainly as ambitious, in design, as that of
the great medieval epic tex t-and meta-text--of the Florentine divine
poet,
Eco on Finnegans If/like:
It lIlay Sel'lIl that lJIl'sses \'iolatl's the techniques of the novel bPylllld
all limit, but Fill I/ega 1/,1' 1I'(lke passes even this limit. It lIlay sel'lIl that
Clysses delllonstrates all the possibilities of langua~e, but FillllegallS
1f'(lke takes lang-ua~l' beyond any boundary of comnllinicahility. It lIlay
seelll that U(rsses represents the most arduous atlt'lIlpt to g-i\'e physi-
ng-nolllY to chaos, but Filll/egans 1I(lke defines itself as Chaos/llos ami
;Hic:rochas/II, and constitutes the lIlost terrifYing doculllent of 1()r1l1al
instahility and sPlIlantic alllbig-uity that we P"SSl'SS, 11
From the heginning-, Fl/II/egal/s 1f(lke allllOllllces what it will be-a
nocturnal epic of ambig-nity and IIll'talnorphoses, the lIlyth of a death
and a uni\'(~rsal rebirth, in which each figun' and each word will stand
in place of all the others, It will be an epic without clear divisions
hptween tht' l'vcnts, so that each l'wnt lIlay illlplicate thc others to
forlll an e1enlt'ntary unity that does not cxclude tilt' collisilln and oppo-
sition between COil traril's,! ~
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This work-a pun of puns, we may say, and a metaphor of mdaphors-
is structured circularly, unendingly opening itself onto itself, in a cease-
lessly new re-enactment of itselt; unendingly tl)luing itself upon itself
A complex icon of the world and of language, a map of nature meta-
morphoseu into culture, Finnegans IVake is the ideal book intenued tor
the ideal reader sutfering Ii'om an ideal insomnia. It is an open work:
For this reasoll it is a scherzarade (galliI', 'scherzo', charade, tale of
Sheherazadl'), a vicucyc!ollleler, collideuscope, proli'!Iurlll gmph, p0l.yhedroll
CIt saipillre, mellnder/I/(/!e alld, tillally, a work Ig' dUllhfec/"Osslllg /wIgi,!d
/rulhs lind devising /lIif-'iJUrds. I :J
A great epiphany of the cosmic structure resolved into language,
Finnegalls IVake--as exemplary summa of avant-garde poetics, and a
veritable encyclopaedia of avant-garde poetic strategies-is the poetics
of itself By the same token, it marks the birth of a new type of uis-
course and narrative: it lenus voice to Chaosmos.
.loyce's writings can be understood as a continuous discussion of
their own artistic procedures. ".4 Portrait is the story of a young artist
who wants to write A Portrait; U~)'sses.. , is a book which is a model of
itselt; Finnegans if/like is, above all, a complete treatise on its own nature,
a continuous definition of 'the Book' as the Ersatz of the uni\'erse,"14
This introuuctory section could be ti'uittlllly brought to an end by
highlighting the ditlerences obtaining between the old, classical and
medieval, world-order and the emerging new conceptions of reality. For
Aristotle and Aquinas-tl)r instance-the uni\'erse is a closed, tinite,
complete, stable, and ordered organism. It is, precisely, a cosmos ruled
by rational principles such as the principle of identity, of non-contra-
diction, of the 'excluded third'. To their mind, the cosmic order unfl)lds
towards an appointed goal, through a chain of causal relations.
The contemporary and modern scnsibility, in which Joyce shared
and which-at once-he helped to forge, construed an image of the
universe imperfect anu incomplete, boundless, open-ended and in con-
tinuous expansion, unstable and precarious. Reality is, then, seen as con-
stantly threatened with total collapse, also because fundamentally \'oid
of any secure telos. It is conceived as a 'happening' of a series of random
events, prey to relativity and relativism, adrift away II'om causal links,
deserted by the power of rational principles. This is the ilJlage of a uni-
versc construed as deprived of an ontological core and a stable ground.
The \'oice of Being has filded away, to let subjectivity, language,
endless selJliosis, and ria/hi/lice speak instead. The artist has to tace
the challenge of a possible reintegration, by giving birth to 'a terrible
beauty'.
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Joyce must have been, if blintly and sub-consciously, aware of this
when he wrote in A Portrait:
-MacAlister, answercd Stephen, would callm)' t'stlll'tic thcory applied
Aquinas. So fill' as this side of esthetic philosophy extends, A'Iuinas
will carry me all along- the line. "'hen we come to the phenom('lIa
of artistic conception, artistic g-estation, and artistic reproduction [
re'luire a new terminology and a new p(-rsonal experience.!:;
II.
The total body of Joyce's li'agmentary retlections on matters of beauty,
aesthetic experience, poetic strategies, and art (i.e., literature as a dra-
matic art) deals with the t()lIowing main issues:
1) the autonomy of art;
~) the impersonality of the \\'01'1, of art, as a self-contained o~iect;
3) the division of art (literature) into three main genres: lyric, epic,
dramatic;
+) the nature of the aesthetic emotion;
5) the criteria for the definition of beauty. which actllally turn out to
be the criteria li)r an aesthetic experience;
6) the concept of 'epiphany'.
To this list could be added the themes of the \'ocation of the poet, and
the nature of tilt' poetic activity.
I shall li>eus on poillts 4·, :J, and (i, but I \\'ill say a little about the other
points. \Vith relerence to the autonomy of art, Joyce cleverly invokes
the authority of Aquinas to counter the moralistic and pedagogical con-
ception of art held by his university teachers. This \\'ay, he smuggles in
the current idea of 'art lor art's sake', and the aesthete's conviction that
'all art is perfectly useless', as Oscar Wilde would put it. But he does this
mainly 1<)1' poJemical reasons. There was no inclination in Joyce--:iust as
in Aquinas and in Aristotle-to side li)r a purely li)rmalist conception
of art. "Ve lind in .loyce's \'()ice a distant echo of the age-long distinc-
tion between primarily useful and primarily aesthetic arts and crafts.
The idea of the impersonality of the worl, of art had already been
announced by the French symbolists, Mallarmc, Baudelaire, Flaubert,
and by Yeats, to mention but a lew; and liHnld a new-more system-
atic-li>r/llulation in the writings of 1'. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound. Joyce
left aside any mystical and symbolist overtone and lilcused on the
work as a perfect self-contained organism which-linally-displays its
internal structural laws, independent of the personal intentions of the
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empirical author. And, so, he could write: "Art... is the human disposition
of sensible or intelligible matter li)r an aesthetic end."IG
This llIay sound a I~\irly accurate paraphrase of Aquinas's delinition
of art as 'recta ratio lactibilium' or 'ratio recta aliquorum I~\ciendorum'.
But while the medieval detlnition-which repeats classical lormula-
tions-rclers to art in g-eneral, any kind of human prouuetion, Joyce
adds "Iix an aesthetic end", thus pointing to our modern iuea of line art
and to its aesthetic autonomy. In all this, "The artist, like the Gou of
creation, remains within or behinu or beyond or above his handiwork,
invisible, retlned out of existence, inuitlerent, paring his lingernails."I;
The hierarchical di\'ision of art-that is, literature-into the lyrical,
the epic, the dramatic liJrllls reproduces anu echoes Aristotle's and-in
more recent times-Hegel's anu Schopenhauer's classilications. The
uefinitive inlluence, however, seems more clearly to have heen Lessing,
to whose Laocoon.Jo)'ce rclers more often and more explicitly.
Also, this division and progression lI'om the personal and inward
voice of lyrical diction to the sound of universal human destiny in
drama points to the autonomy and impersonality of art: "Ry drama I
understand the interplay of passions to portray truth."ls And so, the
reason lor his putting drama at the very apex of art is that, in his mind,
in drama-tragicomedy, I would suggest-the artist, having unearthed
that type of truth which is heauty, does more than simply point it out
and interpret it to others. In drama, according to .Joyce, the artist "I;\sh-
ions that beaut), as a thing, a thing among other things, and casts it out
upon the world where men's eyes may light upon it."I!! After that, the
artist goes hack to paring his lingernails...
III.
To ueal with the central points mentioned hel()re, we need to hrielly
consider Thomas Aquinas's central aesthetic tenetsYu Furthermore, to
auequatel)' contextualise our presentation, we must 1()fUS on two impor-
tant themes in Aquinas's philosophy: the principle of analogy, and the
problem of the transcendental properties of heing, as two unavoidable
metaphysical presuppositions.
In the medieval Christian world, God was conceived of as the maker
and the existential source of everything that there is. Everything was
seen to participate, in varying degrees, in the divine perfection of being.
For this reason, the multiplicity of ditlerent entities in the universe
were understood to share their being with one another, regardless of
their concrete diversity. This is what the principle of analo~y signifies:
a participation in a comlllon pool of existence, a universal lIlutuality
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that co-exists with dillerence. /\11 things in the universe diller from
one another, are distinct fi'om one another, and are identical only with
themseh'es; and yet at the same time they mutually point to one another
across the vast ocean of being, in so f;lr as they share in the power to
be. Beings, we could say, are like siblings: brothers and sisters. Each
is different and unique, yet all share in their real, genetically marked,
belonging to the sallie parentis. (The medieval conception of analogy
dearly has nothing to do with the questionable, misconceived, and fal-
sifiable notion of 'fiunily resemblance', as timidly announced by \Vitt-
genstein.)
The principle of analogy took, in the Renaissance, the shape of the
new Neo-Platonic and} Jermetic idea of a cosmic 'sympathia lIniversalis'
and of the 'coincidemia oppositorum', whereby e\Trything loses its
identity and becomes confi/sed with everything else in an endless chain
of metonymic slipping and sliding. Love supersedes reason. Ecstatic
and intuitive cnthusiasm takes the place of rational reflection. The
principle of analogy, and the exercise of analogical thinking, wherein
things retain their separ<lte identity wllile dialectically cOlllmuning
among themseh'es, is substituted with the principle of lIniversal con-
tilsion and equivocity or univocity, in an endless referral of meaning.
(\Ve are, then, led to think that the 'crisis' of modernism, avant-garde,
and post-modernism, started a long time ago.)
Jn so far as being is present in varying degrees in dillerent things,
analogy implies a hierarchical structure of the universe: a kind of
ladder ascending fi'om inorganic matter, through organic matter, plants,
living animals, humans, angelical substances, and finally God. It is
in the light of the principle of analogy that \\'e lIlust understand the
medieval preoccupation with symb(llism in general, and the conviction
that everything is fundamentally linl,ed to e\'CI'ything else. The prin-
ciple of analogy inspired the metaphysical lyricism of a well-known
poem by Alain de Lille (Alanus de/ab Insulis):
Olllnis nllllHli crt'atllra
qnasi liher t't scriptllra
nobis est in speclIlulIl;
nostral' vitae, nostrae lIlortis,
rlOstri stat liS, nostrae sortis
tidele signaclIlulIl.
NostrulIl statu III pingit rosa,
nostri statlls decl'lls glosa,
Ilostrae vitae lectio;
qual' dum primo malle floret,
ue/loriHus /los eHloret
vesperti 110 S('II io.!! I
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["En'ry creattlre of this earth is like a picture or a book; it is a mirror
of ourselves. It is a j;tithfiil sign of our lifl' and of our death, of our
condition and our f;lte. The roSe is a picture. a fitting image of our
state. a lesson on our life; ti,r it flowers in early morning, and the
fading flower blooms in the evening of age."]
The poem could serve as a manifesto of the medieval sensibility. articu-
latinp; and celebratin~ the analogical order of reality, and therefore the
possibility of a universal symbolism, alheit rooted in the ontological
structure of reality.
The principle of the analogical structure of reality points, in turn,
to the other flllldamental medieval assumption, encoded in the notion of
the transcendental properties of heing. This theory, Aristotelian in its
provenance, was given its definitive fl>rln hy Aquinas who applied it to
his understanding of beauty. The theory held that being in general-
and hence each individual bein~ or thing-is one, true, and good. Being
and unity. just lil,e being and truth, and being and goodness, cullver-
tUlltUr: they are interchangeable and co-extensive. Unity connotes a
thing's identity with itself and distinctness /i'om everything else. Truth
means an absence of contradiction, and thus an intelli~ihility or know-
ability: an openness to the inquiring mind. Goodness means appetibility,
desirability, and therefore the capacity to serve as a goal for the will.
Being is unified within itself and distinct from what it is not; it is fi'ee
from contradiction, and therefore an object of intellection; it is a posi-
tive value and the object of will and desire. Ever'ything that is, precisely
in so far as it participates in the activity of being, by the same token
participates-analogically-in the transcendental properties of being:
it is one, true and intelligible, good and desirable.
It has been argued that Aquinas considered beauty to be yet another
transcendental property of heing.~~ From this it would fIlII ow that, as
Aquinas put it, 'There is nothing that does not participate in beauty."~:1
Aquinas's reflections on beauty and art were never set tllrth sys-
tematically. but are dispersed through his works in a t1'agmentary and
occasional fashion and in a variety of ditl'erellt contexts. Many are to be
found in his commentaries on Aristotle. Others occur in his commentary
on the Pseudo-Dionysius's Diville Names. Pre-eminently they appear in
his Summa Tlteologiae, a mature work in which we find Aquinas's most
developed and definitive views on aesthetics, poetics, beauty, and the
meaning of art.
Aquinas has two complex definitions of beauty, both of which
require further analysis, The first b as !()llows:
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Goodness has to do with appetite/desire Cappetiflls].. Reality, on the
other hand, has to do with the cognitive powers, li,r we ascribe beauty
to things which give us pleasure when they are St'en. Thus beauty con-
sists in due proportion, because the senses talie delight in things duly
proportioned as being similar to themselves-ti)r the senses, and every
cognitive power, are a kind of reason. Cognition takes plan' tlwough
assimilation, and assimilation pertains to order, so beauty properly
belongs to the realm of lormal causes.~+
This is a passage of sOllie density, but we can extract fi'olll it the core
of a definition: those things are called bmlltijitl which, when seen, grallt liS
pleaSilre. It should be noted that this is an objectivist definition of beauty,
since the logical subject of the sentence is "things which give pleasure
when seen."
The second definition, in contrast, has a subjectivist flavour, since it
focuses upon the experiential side of the equation. \Vhen ex trapolated
fro III its context, it is as follows: "let that be called beauty, the very
apprehension of which pleases." Here, apprehension is the subject of the
sentence and is clearly indicated as the cause of delight. Hut we Illust
be warned that the subjective experience of apprehension is, more than
a psychological reaction, a cognitive and affective experience triggered
and justified by the objective structure of beautiful things:
It is part of the nature of beauty that, in seeing- or knowing it. the will
and dt'sire Cappellills] come to rest. The senses involved in the experi-
ence of beauty-sight and hearing-are those particularly involved
in cognition. Thus we speak of beautifiil sights and beautifiil sounds.
In the case of the other senses we don't speak of beauty; we don't call
tastes ami smells beautiliJl, \Vhat the notion of beauty adds t(l the
notion of good is an involvement with the cogniti\'e powers. \Ve call
sOlllething good when it satisties the "'ill and desire Cappetiflls]; but
we call it beautiful when the simple apprehension [ipsa apprehe/lsio: the
\'t~ry apprehension itsell] of it gi\'es us pleasure.~:;
The central elements in these two detinitions arc sight or vision
(ViSIO), and pleasure or delight (complacelltia), in the first definition; and
apprehension or sense-perception (apprehf.llsio), and again pleasure or
delight (colI/placelltia), in the second definition. t\ detailed analysis of
these elements, together with some reference to Aquinas's conception of
the human faCilities, will bring to light the richness and complexity of
the detinitions. To begin with, visio, in the first definition is relined in the
second into the notion of apprehellsio: sight (visia) stands for perception
in general, but particularly for the senses of sight and hearing (and not
for taste, touch and smell, not if the object of perception is the beau-
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tiful). V;s;o refcrs also to intellectual apprehension, which is a form of
cognition. Modern linguistic practice warrants the metaphorical use of
the word 'seeing' to signifY intellectual grasp and understanding, Thus
we talk of 'seeing the point' that Aquinas is making. It is a usage that
is entirely consistent with Aristotle's obsen'ations and with "Vestern
tradition, according to which knowledge is a kind of sight, an 'insight'
as we say. For Aquinas, moreover, the analogy between sight, sense-per-
ception and intellectual insight does not rest solely on a metaphorical
transposition and displ<lcelllent. For Aquinas sense-experience cannot
be separated fi'onl cognition, but rather is related to and structured by
intellectual experience, (Ipsa paceptio quaedam illtellectio est), The senses,
as he put it, are a kind of reason, He also wrote:
The word seeing or vision indicates [palel ill lIolllille visiollis] that
it refers in the first instance to the activity of the sense of sight.
But hecause of the dignity and certainty of this sense the name is
extenued, in accordance with liuguistic usage, to all cognition hy the
other senses... and ultimately even to intellectual knowledge.c!u
The second vital element in the definition of beauty is pleasure or
delight (complacentia or delec/atio), Aquinas, as we have already men-
tioned, holds that in seeing or Imo\\ing beauty, "the will and desire
(appetitus) come to rest",
Pleasure amI delight retcr to: 1) the gratilication of the senses when
confronted with ol~iects that have certain properties, and that we call
beautiful; and ~) the mental satisl~lction we experience when we have
adequately grasped the lorm or internal structure of a physical object
presented to the senses. More importantly, however, pleasure is pro-
duced by 3) the satisf~lctionof 'appetite', Appet;tus-like the Greek orexis,
epith,)'mfa, bO/llesis-means both 'desire' and 'will/love' taken jointly. It is
the movement of the will to possess what one desires/craves because
one judges it to be good. Aquinas says that pleasure comes fi'olll the pos-
session of what we love: "The cause of pleasure is love. For everyone
takes delight in whatever he possesses and loves."c!7
"Ve can thereti)J'e conclude that, for Aquinas, beautiful things are
objects of love and will/desire. They are not only sensuously percep-
tible and knowable, bllt also lovable and good. There is goodness in
beauty, and so the experience of beauty involves 0111' desires and our will
as well as our cognitive hlculties.
We hasten to add that Aquillas, li)lIowing Aristotle, is qllite clear
about the conceptual distinction between goodness and beauty: good-
ness is the proper o~jeet of the will, while beauty is primarily the
proper object of sensation and cognition. However, at the same time,
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he identilied in the beautiful object the presence of goodness, without
which we could not feel the sense of emotional delight, pleasure and
well-being that aesthetic experience grants us. As he put it:
Beallty and g"oodness are the sallie thing- in an object, lilr both clarity
and consonance are "ontained within the concept of g"oodness. Hut
they diller conceptually [ratione:, hecause oeallty adds on to goodness
a reference to the 1\Il(lwlcd~e that something is the way it is,~~
\Ve are now in a position to reconstruct Aquinas's conception of aes-
thetic experience. In the presence of beauty, whether natural or artistic,
we perceive sensible properties that stilllulate and gratify our senses.
Sensory experience leads to an intellectual insight into the structure,
order and Il)rlll of the ol~ject, so that the intellect is stimulated and
gratified in its turn by its intuitive grasp of the lixllI. Anytbing that is
perceived, and whose lorm is intuiti\'ely known, is experience':l as desir-
able, and, as a result, stilllulates our emotions also. The harmonious
correspondence between the ol~iect and our laculties brings it about
that our senses, our intellect, and our will are satislied, and tbis gener-
ates a sense of pleasure and delight: an experience of contemplative
rest or stasis.
It is an experience in which all our lilCulties arc ani\'e and pertectly
harmonised among themselves, just as they are pertectly attuned to the
ol~ject of contemplation. \Ve experience an intuitive, grati(ying unity
of all our lilculties with all the aspects of an object which exhibits
truth, in so hlr as it is intelligible and open to tbe intellect; and exhibits
goodness, in so IiII' as it is desired by our will and grants delight. The
aesthetic experience is a harmonious and unifying experience in which
subject and object cannot be separated and distinguished. (As Yeats put
it, How can we k,w'w t!le dllllcer./i'Olll t!le dllllce'!) That experience of fusion
is al,in and analogous to the experience of love, both physical and spiri-
tual, and to the experience of deep retlection, prayer, and anticipated
beatilic vision.
\Ve can now appreciate the claim that Aquinas regarded Beauty as
a lourth transcendental property of being and, even more dramati-
cally and spectacularly, tbat Beauty is the synthesis of the other three
transcendentals (Unity, Trutb and Goodness), If we were to accept this
claim, we would be compelled to hold that everything is beautiful in its
own way. This, however, would turn the specifically aesthetic meaning
of beauty into a metaphysical category applicable to everything tbat
is. \Ve would be swimming in a metaphysical 'pankalfa', Aquinas seems
to be quite close to tbis position, whicb was congenial to the medieval
conception of the univers(' as a beautiful masterpiece issuing li'om the
hands of God, the supreme artist.
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Aquinas belien~d that objects had to possess certain properties in
order to be beautiful. He took two of these: proportion and clarity,
directly from the I'seudo-Dionysius:
Frolll ,,·hat Dionysills has written we can gather that the notion of
beallty involves hoth clarity and proportion-for he says that God is
called bealltitid becallse He is the calise of consonance allli clarity in
the lIniverse.~~)
And elsewhere he wrote:
\Ve call a lIlan healltitid becallsl' of his correct proportions in size and
shape, and hecallse he has a bright and glowing colollr. So it sholild
be accepted in other cases that a thing is called bealltiflll when it pos-
sesses the clarity of its kind, whether spiritllal or corporeal, and is
constrllcted in the correct proportions.:H1
Two things are worth noting in these passages. Firstly, the proper-
ties of clarity and proportion are not just material properties, but can
be properties of material and non-material entities alike. Aqllinas was
keenly interested in the nature of material beauty, to a much greater
extent than most of his medieval predecessors; but he did not think for
a moment that beauty was merely physical. Secondly, both of these pas-
sages-:iust like the two detinitions of beauty analysed earlier---empha-
sise the semantic function of the word 'beauty'. Aquinas seems to be
concerned with the meaning of the term, the reasons why we call some-
thing beautiful. (I n his attention to 'how and why we call things the way
we do', Aquinas shows more strongly the Aristotelian influence).
In contemporary philosophy, the distinction-and even separation-
he tween the semantic and the ontological is thought to be pertinent
and significant. For Aquinas, the semantic function presupposes and
is grounded in the ontological realm. \Ve should not be misled by his
manner of writing into thinlling that he was a closet sceptic about the
objectivity of beauty, and a pragmatist or even a 'family reselllblance-ist'
and a nominalist.
To the concepts of clarity and proportion, taken lI"om the I'seudo-
Dionysius, Aquinas added a third property: integrity. All three proper-
ties arc detined in a passage li"om the Summa Theo!ogUle:
Three things are necessary tiJr beallty. The tirst is integrity or per-
ti.'ction; ti,r whatever is detective is therd(Jre lIgly. The second is dlle
proportion or consollanCl'. The third is clarity, so that whatever has a
hright and clear colollr is called healltitil1.:l1
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a) Illtegri~v or pe~fi'ction signifies the completeness of something-,
It sig-nifies that an ol~iect can be calbl heautifid provided that it
exhibits all the structural and organic elements that its specific
nature or essence requires, It cannot be bcautifid if it lacks any
of its ontologically necessary attributes and elements, 1\ }Ilnnan
body is disfigured hy the ahsence or privation of a limb or organ.
and is thus imperfect and ugly, Beauty is grounded in ontological
completeness and perfection. Obviously. this criterion is particu-
larly and primarily applicable to natural organisms and phenomena.
rather than to wOrllS of art,
b) Proportion or harmony had already heen identified as an aes-
thetic property by the Pythagoreans, The I'ythag-oreans, however,
understood proportion primarily in quantitative and mathematical
terms, (For this reason, I'lotinus had difliculty with this concept as
pertaining to beauty), In Aquinas we find rather a qualitative con-
ception of proportion, which had heen adumhrated by Augustine
bcfilre him, This he called convenient/{[, which means an intrinsic
attuncment and correspondence, whether in the physical or the
spiritual world, a correspondence between inner and outer reality,
appearance and essence, matter and form.
c) CI{/ri~}', finally, was explained in the first instance in terms of
bright primary colours (color ni/idus). And this is scarcely sur-
prising in view of the predominant medie\'al \'isual taste, some
trace of which can still he witnessed, with spectacular efleet, in the
vibrant flags, scarves, and costumes at Siena's pallo, ti)r instance, as
in other contemporary medieval pageants, or in the colours of the
stained-glass windows of churc:hes and cathedrals, and in Hyzan-
thine and Gothic iconography. However, Aquinas also spoke of the
clarity and beauty of \'irtlle and, more radically. stated that "the
clarity of a glorified body derives fi'olll the clarity of the sou\,,:~2 In
this sense, clarity signifies the shining forth of fimn or essence in
11Jateriai and physical appearances,
Plato had spoken of beauty as 'the splendour of truth' ('aletheia'
means precisely revelation and 'epiphany'), Augustine had defined
beauty as 'the splendour of order', and Albert the Great had defined it
as 'the splendour of f()rm', Aquinas \\'as ,marc of his predecessors and,
hence, understood clarity as the splendour-the diaphanous lumines-
cence--of an intelligible form shining through matter, Clarity is the
selt:'revelation and the self:'transparency of inner truth, in its mate-
rial embodiment, The splendour of physical and bodily appearances is
due to the clarity of the spiritual principll~soul and essencl~\\'hich
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manifests itself in every material body or structured arte/;lct. Beauty
is therdore splendour--or luminous revelation and manifestation--of
unity, truth, and goodness.
Aquinas's conception of art and the arts was profi.llmdly influenced
by Aristotle, and most of his nlllllerous references to art are to be fiHIIH.I
in his Commentaries on Aristotelian texts, especially the P/~\'sics and
the Nicomadzean Ethics. There is no evidence that he read, or knew oC
Aristotle's Poetics, even though partial translations and paraphrases of
that work were available during his lifetime. His definition of art, as
recta ratio jilctibi/illlll (the rational knowledge and way of how to make
things) was, howcver, entirely cOIl\'entional in mcdieval times.
The phrase recta mtio jizctibi/illm rdi.·rs to art in the broad sense of all
the arts and cratts. all maJllIfacturing and purposeful manipulation of
the physical world. It emphasises the role of knowledge and intellect in
these processes. "The structure of ani facts," hc wrote, "derives from the
ideas of their makers, and consists of composition, order and shape":~j
Hut he also fi.)lIowed Aristotle in connecting art with nature. It is just
because art is a rational process that it fits in with the intelligible order
of the created world. Aquinas therdore explained Aristotle's claim that
art imitates nature in the following way:
Art imitates nat lire. The "eason is that the principle of artistic activi-
ties is kllo\Vll'dge.... ~atlll'al things Glll he imitated hy art, hecause. by
a certain intellectllal principle. all nature is directed to an cnd. and a
work of natllre has the character of a \Vorl, of intelligence: it moves
to its certain goal by determinate methods. Thns, art imitates nature
in its activity:H
Art imitates nature by deploying the same purposefulness that we can
observe at work in the natural world. One significant modification that
Aquinas made to this theory is in the phrase "by virtue of a ccrtain
intellectual principlc". The intellectual principle is God. For Aristotle.
the teleological character of nature is just the way nature happens to
be, whereas fill" Aquinas it signifies the creative intellect of the divine
creator. For Aquinas, therefore, when art imitates the intelligent order
of nature it is exercising an intelligent creati\'ity that bears the mark of
its source in God.
Aquinas did not have a clear concept of what we now call fine art.
Hc did renect fi'om tillle to time upon represcntational an, fill" instance
whell he wrote, OOAn illwge is called healititiJl if it represents its object,
even an ugly object, pertectly.'·:l!· Rut it should be remembered that
whenever Aquinas wrote that art aims to produce arrangement, order
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and shape, this also meant that art aims to produce something aes-
thetically beautiful. All works of art are, like nature itself; signs of the
divine. The human artist emulates and resembles the divine artist.
IV
Let us now return to Joyce. And we must note--to begin again-that
Joyce's stance with regard to Aristotle and Aquinas is, to put it mildly,
ambiguous. Furthermore, his actual knowledge of Aristotle and
Aquinas has certainly been exaggerated by most critics. \Vith refer-
ence to Aquinas, in particular, Joyce does not seem too clear as to
where he precisely stilllds. In The Ho~}' qiJiu, he claims to be "Steeled
in the school of the old Aquinas".:lG Elsewhere-in Stephen Hem17 and
A Portraifl8-he ironically refers to his aesthetic musings as 'applied
Aquinas', while explicitly rejecting the premises of Scholasticism (in
Stephen Hero), and admitting (in A Portmit): "I can work on at present
by the light of one or two Ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas.... I need
them only for my own use and guidance until I have done something for
myself by their light.":I~J Finally, Stephen confesses to having read only
a garner of slender sentences from Aristotle's poetics and psychology
and a .~ynopsis Philosophiae SdlOlasticae ad mentem divi Thomae. (Valery
Larbaud has recorded .loyce's confession that "il passait plusieurs
heures chaque soir ;1 la bibliotheque St. Genevieve lisant Aristote et St.
Thomas d'Aquin."40)
From his misquotations of Aquinas, in his Pola Notebook, we may
"infer that Joyce had probably never read directly f.·om the texts of
Aquinas",+1 and never extensively anyway, but only indirectly through
the mediation of the mentioned compendium-God knows how
accurate-Known as Synopsis Philosophiae Scholasticae ad mentl'm divi
Thomae."f'2 As f()r his knowledge of Aristotle, the story is even more
complicated, since Joyce read few excerpts of (relatively poor) transla-
tions, Imew no Greek, and was not \·astly informed about ancient Greek
art, culture and sensibility. \Ve must also add that the relatively meager
serious Aristotelian scholarship available at the time was far removed
from .loyce's reach.
Joyce was acquainted superficially with Greel, mythology, also
because all that was available to him was, by our standards, romanti-
cised and simplified versions of that wealthy tradition. This does not
really matter, in the end, since Joyce did not claim to be, and should
not be regarded as, either a professional philosopher or a classicist. \Ve
glean from his Paris Notebook-and later passages in Stephen Hero and /l
Portrait-that he was aware of some of the central issues in Aristotle's
Poetics, for he mentions the question of defining rhythm, the imitation
of nature by art, pity and terror.
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However, even Aristotle's theory is treated very much according to
Joyce's pr~judices: an instance of 'applied Aristotle'. In his ingenious,
cunning, and customarily spongy filshion, Jim took what he could, from
whatever source he could: whether of money or information:'3 Rut
what he took, including money, he made it his own: all grist to his mill.
\Vhene"er mention is made of Aquinas and Aristotle, our attention
is drawn to the Paris ami Polo Notebooks and to their elaboration in
Stephen Hero and especially A Portrait q/ the Artist as a Toung 1\'[an.
In the Pola Notebook, Joyce gi\'Cs two quotations fi'om Aquinas, and
they are both incorrect. 'Pukera sunt quae visa placent' (from Summa
Theologiae, I q.5 a.+) should actually read: 'pulchra enim dicuntur quae
visa placent'. And 'bonum est in quod tendit appetitum' (Colltra Gent.,
ch.III) should read with the masculine (and not neuter) gender of 'appe-
tite/desire·... It is appetilu.\, as the Editors of Critical IVritings have cor-
rectly amended. (I note that the same editors, while correcting the mis-
spellings in the first quotation, fail to give us the exact text. They add
'ea' to Aquinas's text, between diCIIII/ur and quae). In A Portrait, appeti/us
is correctly spelled.
\Ve encounter Illisquotations again in Slephf.ll Hero and, later, in A
Portrait: "Aquinas, answered Stephen, says pulcm sUllt quae visa placellt."H
On this occasion, the 'h' is missing fi'om 'pulchra' (sunt replaces diculltllr).
The same mistal,e is made again, at page 21~.
\Vhat should we make of Joyce's misquoting? Aware of the writer's
skill in the art of dtpistage, we must ask: were the misquotations inten-
tional or un-intentional:l If the latter, were they due to carelessness
and mis-writing, a lapsl/s pll/meae, or to a writing after recollection:) (\Ve
must not fail to note that in the mentioned tex t of the SIIII/Illa Theo-
logiae, from \\'hich Joyce misquoted the definition of beauty, Aquinas
gives also a delinition of goodness, and writes: "N am bonum proprie
respicit appetitum." Diu Joyce mix up his sources, his feeble Latin,
and his notes?) If intentional, was this another game of depistage? Of
course, Ic)\" the misspellings Ic)\mc! in the Notebooks we could think of a
more banal cause: an incorrect transcription by the editors perhaps not
"ery familiar with Latin.
The 'neutering' of the masculine appetitus (ore.ris, el)itJ~ymia, hOulesis),
in the definition of goodness, may excite the fl'ee-associative imagination
of Freudians, not to mention Lacanians; but it presents no conceptual
diHiculty, On the contrary, .loyce's writing of "Pukhra sunt quae visa
placent" becomes conceptllally intriguing, when we note his transla-
tion: "Those things are beautiful the apprehension of which pleases".45
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In A Portrait. we read:
-Aquinas, said Stephen. says that is beautiful the apprehension of
which pleases.
L)'nch nodded.
-I remelllber that, he said, Pu/cra SIll/I quae Visa pll/em!.'H;
Stephen's anticipated translation of the quotation ~iven by Lynch actu-
ally refers to another text by Aquinas. where we read: "pulchrum autem
dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet." n But with this we witness.
within the span of three lines. the slipping and sliding li'om Aquinas's
ontologically and ol~iecti\'c1y conceived nature of beauty, as residing-
within reality itself; to an intentional. psychological and subjective loca-
tion of beauty in the act of apprehension as source of delight.
Other texts, Ii'om the youthful papers Drama and LiP and the subse-
qucnt one on .rames Clarence Mangan. ha\'e been innJked in support of
the argument that Joyce held an understanding of beauty as an objec-
tive ontolog-ical property. In the lirst paper we read: "Art is true to itself
when it deals with truth."+s And truth is defined as "the deathless pas-
sions, the human verities."+~) This reference to truth. which according
to some commentators would ground the ontological value of beauty,
is further developed in the paper on Mangan. Hugh Bredinso reminds
us that Joyce had. at this stage (W02) COllie across and been impressed
by Flallbert's paraphrase of Plato's .\)'mposi/lm: "Le beau... est la splen-
deur du Hai." Accordingly. he wrote: "Reauty. the splendour of truth.
is a gracious presence when the illlagination contelllplates intensely
the truth of its own being or the visible world. and the spirit which
proceeds out of truth and beauty is the holy spirit of joy...SI I think it
would be dising-enuous to presume that .royce understood beauty. truth.
and g-oodness ontologically. as ka!oagath!a. in Plato's sense.
The mainly subjecti\'e value of .Joyce's concept of beauty re-emerges
again, when he writes in the Pola Notehook of 190+: "Even the most
hideous object llIay be said to be beautiliil, in so lar as it encounters the
activity of simple pcrception....')~ And when. cOllling closest to an objec-
tive definition of beauty. he writes: "Beauty is that quality of a sensible
object in virtue of which its appl'ehension pleases or satisfies the aes-
thetic appetite which desires to apprehend the most satis(ying- relations
of the sensible... ;,:) the objectivity of "sensible object" is cancelled out by
the subjectivity of "satisfYing- relatiolls" ..'>4
\Vhat did Joyce make of the objective properties ascribed by Aquinas
to that which we call beautiful: integritas .leu pe(/fd/o (wholeness). conso-
nantia (harmony). daritas (radiance)?
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\Vith reference to the first, it seems clear that "'hile Aquinas under-
stood inlegritas as a substantial completion, .Ioyce understood it as
spatial delimitation. Aquinas thought of ontological volume, Joyce of
physical perimeter. \\lith reference to consonanlia or harmony, Joyce
clearly states that "weJeel... the rhythm of its (an object's) stnlcture."55
As for clanias, clearly Aquinas meant-despite his distracting refer-
ence to color nilidlls-the transparency, manifestation and knowability
of the f()I'1Il and (Jllidditas (or generic essence) of a thing. For Joyce, it
is the epiplwnic intuition or apprehension of 'this one thing here': the
Aristotelian concept of inllmlllent substance as lode fl, and the Scotist
haecr.eilas':'G
Here clarilas meets 'epiphany'. And let IIle stress, about 'epiphany'
also, its essentially subjective value. It is not so much the sudden illu-
mination and re\'elation of something fl'om within (splendor veri,Jormae,
ordinis), but the intuitive apprehension of something from without, that
gives aesthetic value to sOlllething, no matter how ugly, meaningless,
and quotidian. Pointing to a clock, Stephen says: "Imagine my glimpses
at that clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its
vision to an exact fi)cus. The moment the focus is reached the object
is epiphanised.""~ Hugh Bredin comments: "The radiance of beauty
is defined in terms of the spiritual eye and the focusing vision. \Ve
epiphanize the object."":) And, in Joyce's words, "the instant wherein the
supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the aesthetic image,
is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its
wholeness and fascinated by its harmony, is the luminous silent stasis of
esthetic pleasure..... !)!)
Another quite substantial ditlerence must be noted. For Aquinas,
integrity, consonance, clarity (in .Joyce's words, "wholeness, harmony,
and radiance") define ontological aspects of whatever is beautiful, and
furthermore they are co-present at the same time. For Joyce, on the
contnlry, they become attributes of things in so far as they arc solic-
ited, conjured, and produced by an aesthetic perception. Moreovet', they
emerge separately and progressively along a temporal experience that
proceeds by sllccessive steps. A section of the conversation between
Stephen and Lynch illustrates this point:
-Look at thaI hasket, he said.
-I see it, said Lynch.
-In order to see the basket, said Stephen, your mind first of all
separates the basket fro III the rest of the visihle universe which is not
the basket. The lirst phase of apprehension is a bounding line drawn
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about the object to be apprehended. An esthetic image is presented to
us either in space or in time. \Vhat is audible is presented in time, what
is visible is presented in space, Hut, temporal pr spatial, the esthetic
unage is lirst luminously apprehended as selfbounded and selfcon-
tained upon the imllleasurable backgrollnd of span- or time which is
not it. You apprehended it as a//e thing. '{ou sec it as one whole. '1'011
apprehend its wholeness. That is i//legnlas.
-BIIII's eye1 said Lynch, lallghing. Go OIL
-Then, said Stephen, yOIl pass from point to point, led by its f<'1I'mal
lines; you apprehend it as balanced part ag-ainst part within its limits;
you feel the rhythm of its strnctllre. In other words, the synthesis
of immediate perception is f(lllowed by the analysis of apprehension.
"Iaving first felt that it is one thing you feel now that it is a IllIng. You
apprehend it as cOlnplex, multiple, divisible, separable, made up of
its parts, the resllit of its par·ts alld their SlIm, harmollious. That is
(()//su//ll//lia.
-Bull's eye again! said Lynch wittily. Tell me now what is clanills and
you win the cig-ar.
- [ ..J \Vhen you have appreht·"ded that basket as one thing aud
havt' then analysed it according to its form alld apprehellded it as a
thing yOIl make the ollly synthesis which is log-ically and esthetically
permissible. You see that it is that thing which it is and 110 other thing.
The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic IJlliddilas, the wlllll-
//ess of a thing. This suprelne quality is felt by the artist when the
esthetic image is first concei"ed in his imagination. The mind in that
mysterious instant Slwllt·y lilwned bealltilillly to a f;lding- coal. That
instant wherein that supreme quality of beallty, the clear radiance
of the esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind which
has been arrested by its wholeness al\(I f;lscinated by its harmony is
the silent stasis of esthetic pleas lire, a spiritual state very lil,e to that
cardiac cOllditioll which the Italiall physiologist Luil-{i Gall-alli, using a
phrase almost as bealltifill as Shelley's, called the enchantment of the
heartGO
.Joyce's understanding of the aesthetic experience, as cpiphanic and
'arresting', points not so much in the direction of a theory of beauty, as
in the direction of a theory of art. .loyce's 'aesthetic' lIIusings, on Aqui-
nas's thellles, are really in function of his poetic preoccupations with
ways of metamorphosing into 101'111, and with mimetic creation-as in
the light of Aristotle's Poetics and lllletoric. And it is also in this respect
that .Joyce can be seen to stand between Aquinas and Aristotle. Aris-
totle, anyway, is ever present in the Thomist texts familiar to Joyce.
But there is more. Young .Jim's understanding of katlllirsis--quite
original and lilscinating-as an arresting experience of stasis, in the joy
of possession (albeit only cognitive and imaginary), brings its meaning
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very close to Aquinas's concept of !.filiI'S in contemplation. One could
say that loyce read Aquinas with Aristotelian eyes, with a view to poetic
strategies, and Aristotle with Thomistic eyes, with a view to estab-
lishing the epiphanic and 'static', or contemplative, eflect of drama: both
tragedy and comedy or, hetter, tra~icomedyGI
The stories of DIlb/lIIers illustrate-most tangibly, with their Ibsen-
like dramatic realism, and in a vein of tragicomedy-loyce's poetics of
epiphany. A chin, a smile, a cup of tea, a song, an echo, a wake, yield the
insight of a previously hidden form. They are not epiphanies of vis-
ibility, but rather dramatic-tragicomic, again-insights into the fabric
of life and character. And the 'arresting' power of the epiphany is in the
words that capture and mould the event.
Here, we may ponder over the extraordinary lact that Joyce showed
an almost total lack of understanding and appreciation of the visual
arts. And he showed no interest whatsoever in visual artistic expres-
sions. The wealth of the artistic teast of epiphanic visibility that
surrounded him, especially during his Italian years, left him totally
untouched. \Ve know that in one of his peevish moments of irritation,
when in Rome, he gave vent to a tirade against Italy, Italian and the
Italians. He wrote: "I hate to think that Italians ever did anything in the
way of art. But I suppose they did." Then, as if he had conceded too
much, he wrote in the margin, "\Vhat did they do but illustrate a page or
so of the New Testament!"t;~
At this point, the concept of 'epiphany' reveals other meanings. It
stands also for the concept of mimesis which, borrowing the words of
I·I.-G. Gadamer, could he delined as 'metamorphosis into lorm' (171'''-
wandillng ins Gebilde) , rather and better than 'imitation' or 'representa-
tion' of nature.
v
To conclude, if we leave aside Joyce's musings with Aquinas's and
Aristotle's aesthetics, his writings-the rich li'uit of his poetic strate-
gies-tell liS that we don't so nllich need to comprehend, but rather
allow ourselves to be 'arrested' by the wealth of human experience
metamorphosed into lorm: into the epiphanic and epiphanising power
of language. Epiphany becomes the amazing revelation, not just of
lorm and essence in beauty, but also (and mainly perhaps) of lorm, plot,
structure, narrative, leehne. It is a happening that we make happen, when
attentive to the possibility of making things utter their music. Epiphany
occurs in those revelatory moments when we think and leeI something
approximately expressible by a sudden "ah, here it is...!,,G:1
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And beauty, according to Joyce is a beauty that we make, even when it
is the beauty and splendour of chaos, tor e\'en chaos is 'metamorphosed
into !()rm' and moulded by the hano of art, Had Joyce been mainly pre-
occupied with beauty, as Aquinas was, and with aesthetic experience, he
might not have produced much as signiticant as he did, Ill' might have
remained a dandy aesthete and a pall' copy of Oscar \Vilde, But he was
Dedalus and he was Ilenlles, at once, He was his own artiticer and he
was his own deda/o: his own labyrinth,!i+
The young Stephen, school child at the Jesuit boarding-school
of Clongowes \\Tood, in Kildare, concei\'ed himself as a member
of a cosmic whole, and wrote on the opening page of his geog-
raphy text-book: "Stephen Dedalus-Class of Elements-Clongowes
\Vood College-SaIl ins-County of Kildare-lreland-Euror>l~The
\Vorld-The Universe,"
The young Joyce, as the young Stephen Dedalus begotten of his
miraculously tertile imagination, began with pursuits of classical order.
However, the architectonic closed structures of Stephen Hero, A Portrait,
and J)lIbliners are, ti'om the very beginning, threatened by the Daedalian
promise and tilte, Dedalus is there, from the outset. ReCillise the raw
material of experience, the tragicomedy of Iite, placed our young arti-
ticer-at once Dedalus and mercurial Ilermcs--on the threshold and
interlace between fact and word, where riddles, mazes and labyrinths
abound. Should we, then, be surprised if the initial epiphany that brings
to light, through the alchemy of art and language, the amazingness of
inncr presence and of structured order, later becomes the epiphany of
the splendour of disorder?
As Umberto Eco puts it:
\Ve have been living in the Tower from the beginning, The first dia-
logue between God and Adam tool, place in Finneganian labyrinths,
and only by returning to Babel and accepting the only real chance
available to us, can we find our peace and embrace the limits, the voca-
tion am] the destiny of our human condition. I ;:;
Joyce wondered, and makes us wonder, at the wonderfully amazing
creative power of the maze of language that, in art, mimetically meta-
morphoses into torm the realm of our Adamic and post-Adamic, Babetic
and post-Babelic, heroic and heroicomic, tragic and tragicomic condition
of being human.
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.0:, A Porlrail, p. '117. :'vIy italics.
51j See lJlid, a.COIiIlOr. RlOgraphers IIlld Ihe Al'l '!lll/ography (Londoll: Quartet Books,
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tation', which carries nlll<:h music,,1 and lIl)'stic;d ,neaning. Joyce-t'''· all his ade(ll1ate
IUHJwlt'dgt> of the Italian 1<mgllag~d(lt"s lIot Set'lll to 10UI\\' that the rC'llexi\'e 'illcall-
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Collt'ge Dllblin Press, 1~J!)8), p. :m. In the Lihrary of Babel there IllIlSt be a cbaosllli,:
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